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Abstract
Cities across the global south are seeing unprecedented levels of violence that generate intense risks and vulnerability.
Such problems are often experienced most viscerally among poorer residents, thus reinforcing longstanding socio-spatial
conditions of exclusion, inequality, and reduced quality of life for those most exposed to urban violence. Frequently, these
problems are understood through the lens of poverty, informality, and limited employment opportunities. Yet an under-
theorized and equally significant factor in the rise of urban violence derives from the shifting territorialities of governance
and power, which are both cause and consequence of ongoing struggles within and between citizens and state authorities
over the planning and control of urban space. This article suggests that a relatively underexplored but revealing way to un-
derstand these dynamics, and how they drive violence, is through the lens of sovereignty. Drawing on examples primarily
from Mexico, and other parts of urban Latin America, I suggest that problems of urban violence derive from fragmented
sovereignty, a condition built upon the emergence of alternative, competing, and at times overlapping networks of territo-
rial authority at the scale of the city, nation, and globe. In addition to theorizing the shifting spatial correlates of sovereignty
among state and non-state armed actors, and showing how these dynamics interact with urbanization patterns to produce
violence, I argue that the spatial form of the city both produces and is produced by changing political and economic rela-
tions embedded in urban planning principles. That is, urban planning practices must be seen as the cause, and not merely
the solution, to problems of urban violence and its deleterious effects. Using these claims to dialogue with urban planners,
this essay calls for new efforts to redesign cities and urban spaces with a focus on territorial connectivities and socio-spatial
integration, so as to push back against the limits of fragmented sovereignty arrangements, minimize violence, and foster
inclusion and justice.
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1. Introduction
In many parts of Latin America, urban violence has
been on the rise (Arias & Goldstein, 2010; Bergman &
Whitehead, 2009; Fruhling, Tulchin, & Golding, 2003;
Laguerre, 1994; Moser, 2004; Rotker, 2002; Smulovitz,
2003). Although violence can unfold at the individual
scale, or within the household (as occurs with gender-
based domestic violence), one of the main challenges for
citizens in urban Latin America is the trauma of violence
at the scales of both neighborhoods and cities as a whole
(Arias, 2006a). Particularlywhendriven by illicit trade and
organized crime, urban violence creates insecurities, vul-
nerabilities, segregations and exclusions in urban spaces
(Koonigs& Krujit, 2007; Perlman, 2010). These conditions
affect all citizens, but may be most damaging to low-
income populations who lack the resources and power
to push back against the root causes of insecurity.
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Scholars who study urban violence often focus on
the employment or policing dynamics that create an
environment where violence flowers. They focus on
endemic poverty and low levels of employment and
education that incentivize crime (McIlwaine & Moser,
2001) or on the insufficient professionalization of law
enforcement and the state’s unwillingness or incapac-
ity to prosecute criminals (Hinton & Newburn, 2008;
Uldriks, 2009). Clearly, all these conditions matter. Yet
they belie a scholarly preoccupation with individual be-
haviors more than with the social, spatial, and gover-
nance contexts—themselves reinforced through urban
planning decisions—in which these behaviors flower. In
this essay, I will argue that urban planning priorities in
Latin America have a direct impact on urban violence,
precisely because the social, spatial, and economic logics
of planning actions serve to territorially exclude and spa-
tially marginalize the poor and the vulnerable. Such pat-
terns not only have an impact on the existence of power
relationships and their territorial distribution in the city;
they also lay the spatial groundwork for the emergence
of certain forms of urban violence. That is, even well-
intentioned urban planning priorities can inadvertently
produce spaces of exclusionwhere justice and rule of law
are absent, and where violence readily flourishes.
Inwhat follows, I seek to reveal the interrelationships
between urban planning and urban violence, on the one
hand, and these practices and the notion of sovereignty,
on the other. In empirical terms, I connect the histori-
cal, political, and governance dynamics of urbanization
to fragmented or reformulated networks of allegiance
distributed unevenly across urban space, and show how
conflicts over who controls territory in the city have com-
bined to produce an explosion of urban violence. It goes
without saying that urban planning practices may create
social exclusion and injustice everywhere, and as such
planning’s disastrous impacts are hardly unique to Latin
American cities (Yiftachel, 1998). Nonetheless, there are
significant differences in urban Latin America owing to
the unique relationships linking urban planning, state
formation, and economic modernization during the mid-
twentieth century that, when combined with the ex-
treme poverty and limited employment associated with
late development, will produce both extreme spatial ex-
clusion and alternative governance practices. Because of
this, I use the concept of sovereignty to reveal the unique
relationships between urban planning, spatial patterns,
and urban violence in Latin America. I argue that this no-
tion allows for a more nuanced and revealing accounting
of these relationships than do conventional frameworks
used to understand urban outcomes, particularly those
framed through the logics of ‘state’ action.
Although commonly associated with the nation-
state, the concept of sovereignty can also be used to
reveal multiple governance logics, not just those ap-
plied to cities but also those that unfold within neigh-
borhoods and other territories beyond. While acknowl-
edging the many influential rigorous historical and crit-
ical genealogical studies of the concept of sovereignty,
offered by scholars such as Malabou (2015), Jackson
(2007), Foucault (2003), Hardt and Negri (2000), and
Bartelson (1995), a widely used (if encyclopedic) defi-
nition of sovereignty is supreme authority within a ter-
ritory (see also Philpott, 1995). Colloquially, the con-
cept is often used to denote supreme power over a
body politic. When applied to urban spaces, the con-
cept of sovereignty invites a focus on territorial locations
that may be controlled or dominated by forces other
than nation-states, including cities or other spaceswithin
them. Further, the concept of sovereignty tends to be
less bureaucratically state-centric and thus better able to
capture the range of cultural, economic, social, and polit-
ical actors as well as spatial practices that comprise the
‘governance regime(s)’ that characterize cities in Latin
America, with these governance regimes unfolding at
scales both smaller and larger than the city or the nation.
One cannot forget that in Latin America the rule of law is
weakly institutionalized (Méndez, O’Donnell, & Pinheiro,
2000; Peruzzotti & Smulovitz, 2006). For this reason, quo-
tidian struggles to establish authority over urban spaces
are constant, often occurring at scales as small as the
street or neighborhood (see, e.g., Arias, 2004, 2006b;
Caldeira, 2001; Davis & Alvarado, 1999; Meade, 1997;
Perlman, 1976). Sovereignty as a concept allows for an
understanding of the ways that citizens may distribute
their political allegiances to actors operating at territo-
rial scales both smaller and larger than nation-states, in-
cluding through relationships with non-state armed ac-
tors whomay use violence to achieve their aims and seek
to control territories of trade in ways that challenge the
authority of states.
In making this argument, I do not necessarily seek
to question or contradict other theoretical apparatuses
used to explain spatial inequality, social injustice, or
other related outcomes produced by hegemonic state
planning practices in capitalist societies, such as those
proposed by David Harvey (1985, 2001) among others,
or their relevance for understanding power and inequal-
ity Latin American cities. Nor do I seek to engage in
theoretical debate as to whether the territorialities of
sovereignty in Latin America examined in this article are
strictly speaking urban (Brenner & Schmid, 2015), as well
as whether these conditions are ‘universal’ or generaliz-
able across the global south, let alone considered to be
exceptional versus ordinary (Robinson, 2006). My ambi-
tions are analytical and empirical, and they consist of fo-
cusing greater scholarly attention on the ways that the
conceptual notion of sovereignty will help us better un-
derstand the competing and overlapping scales of territo-
rial governance that exist and now contribute to endemic
violence in Latin America’s largest cities. These aims not
only build on recent writings from political geographers
who seek to introduce the concept of sovereignty into
the study of space (Mountz, 2013) as well as from those
who raise questions about the importance of recover-
ing ‘the complex politics of the city’ in order to exam-
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ine the potential for equality or inequality (Davidson &
Iveson, 2015). They also align with the work of critical
geographers who examine the scaled territorial dynam-
ics of urban governance (MacLeod & Goodwin, 1999) as
well as those who seek to disaggregate the concept of
urban autonomy to accommodate the empirical realities
of ‘fragmented’ and ‘networked’ forms of association
that operate in and through cities (Bulkeley, Luque-Ayala,
McFarlane, & MacLeod, 2018, p. 705).
In order to synthesize these various theoretical, an-
alytical, and conceptual threads into discussions of the
territorial rescaling of sovereignty in Latin America, I ex-
amine the control of physical space and how efforts to
monopolize coercive and political authority at the scale
of the neighborhood have been set in motion by urban
planning decisions embodied in the history of modernist
planning paradigms as applied to the region. I draw on
Mexico for much of my empirical evidence, where the
level of violence has at times matched that of Iraq and
Afghanistan. In certain locations in Mexico, of which the
border city of Ciudad Juarez is perhaps the most notori-
ous, violence levels were once so high that local officials
called in UN peacekeeping forces, using both the nomen-
clature and the mechanisms historically created for deal-
ing with wartime conflict. All this explains why in the cur-
rent era, drug cartels control large swathes of Mexico’s
northern territories, leading to historic highs in rates of
violence. Yet violence is not specifically a border prob-
lem; nor is it unique to Mexico. In Latin America, Brazil
and Colombia have historically hosted high levels of vi-
olence, and in recent decades Argentina and Venezuela
have joined the ranks. Currently, several countries in
Central America such as Honduras and El Salvador have
been ranked as among the most violent in the world. In
all of these countries, violence at the scale the city has
ratcheted out of control, and in the last 20 years has en-
veloped poor and marginal neighborhoods in ways that
mark a dramatic break from the past.
While violence persists outside poor neighborhoods,
historically it has tended to take hold in marginal-
ized communities, often in informal settlements, where
squatter occupations, ambiguous property rights, and
lack of services accompany everyday life. Yet far from
blaming the victim, I share this observation delete at
the outset in order to focus our attention on urban and
territorial planning roots to these problems, which, as
shall be clear shortly, have reinforced ongoing struggles
between state and non-state armed actors to control
daily conditions and establish sovereignty at the scale of
the city. Over time, these struggles have fueled transna-
tional networks of coercive authority that are larger and
smaller than the nation-state proper, thus recasting the
territorial contours in which urban planning actionmight
provide effective tools to reduce violence and the daily
risks and vulnerabilities that accompany it. In the nar-
rative that follows, I delineate these path-dependent
processes, beginning with a focus on the historical im-
pacts of mid-twentieth century planning priorities for
Latin American cities. After arguing that modernist plan-
ning paradigms produced a schism between the formal
and informal city, I use the case of Mexico to connect
planning-induced patterns of socio-spatial exclusion to
the emergence of informal power brokers who offer al-
ternative governance regimes built on illicit activities in
marginalized areas of the city. I then discuss the rise of al-
ternative sovereignties emerging from these social, spa-
tial, and governance practices, again using evidence from
Mexico where such strongmen have permeated infor-
mal neighborhoods and networked their illegal activities
to a globalizing economy. The essay ends with a reflec-
tion on some possible urban planning tools that might
be devised to address both these alternative sovereign-
ties and the networks and conditions of violence they
have produced.
2. Modernist Urban Planning Paradigms and the
Production of Spatial Inequality
It is not news to anyone who studies Latin American
cities that the poor often need to secure their own forms
of shelter and subsistence (Caldeira, 2001; Heinrichs &
Bernet, 2014; McIlwaine &Moser, 2001; Perlman, 1976).
Nor is it a surprise that they may turn to illegal and
unrecognized actors (or actions) to receive the services
which planning and policy officials fail to provide. Local
authorities, for their part, openly tolerate these informal
practices (at least until recently with the resurgence of
support for neoliberal property rights regimes) because
such a posture helped governments achieve legitimacy
aims (Harvey, 2001; Roberts & Portes, 2005). The toler-
ation of informality has not only helped undermine es-
tablished law in ways that may advance criminality; it
also has empowered the police. This is because police
have considerable discretion, given their mediating role
in political systems where state authorities take advan-
tage of the poor for personal gain. With high levels of
discretion, police often abuse their power in ways that
drive the twin problems of violence and growing inse-
curity. In many Latin American cities, the police have
long been involved in extortion activities, and these prac-
tices have laid the foundation for their more contempo-
rary networking with criminal elements (Dewey, 2012;
Leeds, 1996). Even as they protect or engage with crimi-
nal elements, police also continue to abuse their power
with respect to common citizens,whether because of the
rent-seeking potential inherent to policing or just pure
influence-mongering.
All this suggests somewhat of a paradox: In situations
of violence, one of the first lines of action undertaken
by governing officials is to deploy the police in order to
establish order, not just through law enforcement but
also by better regulating urban infrastructure and ser-
vices. Such actions help authorities fulfil planning objec-
tives even as they establish greater legitimacy among res-
idents. These priorities are a further strengthened when
police arrest local gangs or mafias leaders who have es-
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tablished their authority through unauthorized control
of urban infrastructural services and other local gover-
nance mechanisms (an extreme version of which can
be seen in the deployment of the ‘pacification police’
to fight drug-traffickers in poor neighborhoods across
Rio de Janeiro). Either way, policing and security inter-
ventions are high on the agenda of local officials across
cities facing chronic violence, despite the fact that it is
precisely the police who are frequently the most hated
and the least legitimate arm of the government (Davis,
2012). Police thus see themselves on the frontline of ef-
forts to stamp out any perceived ‘moral disorder’ mark-
ing informal areas, so as to ensure that the ‘patholo-
gies’ of impoverished residents residing in informal ar-
eas do not spread to the formal city (Holston, 1989;
Meade, 1997).
Even so, police interventions in poor communities—
even when conceived by local authorities as a frontline
move to pave the way for better planning action later—
are highly suspect, and thus drive a cycle of mistrust over
the rule of law (Perlman, 2010). The implications of this
are clear: Both the genesis of and reactions to accelerat-
ing urban violence in Latin American have involved some
mode of state territorial control, whether by means of
urban planning practices or by policed-enforced spatial
segregation of cities. So what accounts for this? Several
factors related to the hegemony ofmodernist urban plan-
ning paradigms give us a clue, precisely because they
have produced inequalities that are firmly established
in physical as well as political space, and not merely ‘so-
cial’ space.
One key determinant of these troubling outcomes
has been the widely adopted distinction between the
formal and informal city, which permeates ‘modernist’
planning practices and has contributed to spatial exclu-
sion and the toleration of socio-spatial inequality (Collier,
1976; Gilbert &Ward, 2009; Pezzoli, 1987; Violich, 1987).
In Latin America and elsewhere in the postcolonial world,
the actions of planners—both urban and national—have
been fueled by the presumption that developmental
progress occurs through the transformation and reshap-
ing of ‘untamed’ space so as to establish social, political,
and economic order. At the scale of the nation, these
views were embodied in the twentieth century tendency
toward the ‘colonization’ of territory, often by means
of large-scale infrastructural projects (e.g., roads, high-
ways, and electricity), which subsumed heterogeneous
peoples, places, and natural resources into a project of
national economic expansion (Almandoz, 2002; Violich,
1987). At the city-level, the programmatic concerns of
planners and architects justified the rationalization of so-
cial and spatial order, often in the form of large-scale
plans (Almandoz, 2006; Fraser, 2001). Influenced bymod-
ernist sensibilities imported from Europe, different parts
of the city were preserved for different social and eco-
nomic functions. However, in those sites marked for in-
tegration into the modern economic and political order,
short shrift was given to any ‘pre-modern’ blending of
land uses and to the preservation of informal activities.
One result was the relegation of poor citizens and infor-
mal activities to peripheral and/or marginalized areas of
cities. Even when planners sought to expand the project
of modernization to include evermore citizens and neigh-
borhoods (mostly through investments in worker hous-
ing, transportation, and other services), financial limita-
tions often prevented the provisioning of such goods and
services to the poorest (Davis, 2014).
One consequence of thiswas the emergence of socio-
spatially divided cities across Latin America, in which sig-
nificant proportions of the urban population inhabited
segregated and stigmatized outposts existing ‘outside’
the city’s formal economic and political orders. The res-
idents of these neighborhoods were often invisible to
city officials, and their urban servicing needs were rou-
tinely ignored. The studied failure of planners and city
officials to better conditions within informal settlements
allowed for the further explosion of settled areas with-
out services, formal property rights, or political recog-
nition, let alone sufficient access to the goods and ser-
vices that characterized the formal city. In addition to en-
abling the conditions for ongoing social and spatial sepa-
ration, planners’ failures to address informal settlements
further reinforced thewidespread belief that those living
in such conditions were mere second-class citizens, not
morally worthy of inclusion or recognition. If anything,
these everyday forms of life were considered both a stain
on, and challenge to, the larger project of modernization
(Holston, 1989; Meade, 1997).
Planning officials’ unwillingness to acknowledge the
social and economic value of these ad hoc forms of ur-
ban life, let alone accept them as legitimate or justifi-
able responses to the hardships endogenous to mod-
ernist urbanity, usually gave rise to state actions which at
times included the ruthless destruction of entire neigh-
borhoods populated by informal occupiers. Even when
bulldozing was avoided, the threat of displacement fu-
eled community instability and incentivized new forms
of urban clientelism. All this led to residents’ growing
dependence on informal community leaders to protect
them from state aggression. In the process, these clien-
telistic practices both undermined the strong horizon-
tal networks among community residents and reinforced
vertical networks of authority (both formal and infor-
mal) predicated upon the power of those who could pro-
tect residents in thesemarginalized areas. The result was
the emergence of an array of informal, illicit ‘leaders’
whose legitimacy and authority were buttressed by their
ability to control the activities taking place within these
informal territories/spaces, usually for their own gain.
Whether by directly protecting citizens and property
within these informal territories, or through co-optation
and extortion, informal leaders both cultivated andmain-
tained their power by supplying an ‘alternative’ regime
of governance—or in my terms, a form of sovereignty.
The existence of these informal governance regimes also
served as a check on the capacity of the formal state to in-
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tegrate spaces of informal urbanization intomaster plans
and grand-scale projects unfolding across the so-called
‘formal’ city.
3. Limitations within the Planning Profession: The
Minimal Concern with Economic Livelihoods
A second explanation for the emergence of these ‘alter-
native’ sovereignties is the failure of authorities and ur-
ban planners to address the main livelihood exigencies
of poor residents, which included jobs and basic services.
Indeed, as planners endeavored to construct themodern
city, they turned most of their attention to roadway in-
frastructure, leaving to the market questions of employ-
ment and resources, like electricity and water. Inability
to adequately address employment and basic livability
concerns has been a general weakness in the planning
discipline more broadly, particularly in the early years
of rapid industrialization and urbanization. Yet this was
particularly the case in the developing world where the
adoption of Euro-centricmodernist paradigms privileged
physical over economic and social interventions (Gilbert,
1986). Even those projects intended to facilitate the en-
try of citizens into working life (such as modernist hous-
ing blocs intended to provide shelter for the laboring
classes and/or massive road-building initiatives to facil-
itate urban labor mobility), they tended to neglect other
daily necessities. And while planners continued to prior-
itize abstract, formalized idealizations of the city, a simi-
larly ‘formalistic’ logic continued to dominate the devel-
opment of infrastructure in informal areas, where prior-
ity was often given to official housing programs (in order
to promote formal property rights) and transportation.
Efforts to provide alternative employment opportunities
in informal territories were effectively absent (including
attempts to cultivate and promote a flourishing commer-
cial sector in these informal spaces), primarily because
the growth of commercial activities was taken to be one
of the foundational functions of urban centers and other
highly-differentiated zones within the formal city. As a re-
sult, even when informal areas received infrastructural
investments that corresponded or connected them to
the formal city, local services and economic activities
within informal settlements remained severely under-
developed, at least in terms of state investments and tar-
geted programs, therefore laying the groundwork for in-
creasing impoverishment.
The government’s failure to prioritize employment
goals of the urban poor—coupledwith the fact that state
provided social services were offered primarily to those
in the formal sector (often mediated by the demands
from organized labor)—meant that the physical infras-
tructure of poor, informal neighborhoods soon turned
into the object of economic production, if not employ-
ment (Davis, 2014). This was perhaps best evidenced
in the buying and selling of access to physical services
(housing, water, electricity) as a means of reproduc-
tion (Meade, 1997; Perlman, 1976). Such responses also
made a great deal of sense in a context where the di-
vision of labor between local and national planning au-
thorities reinforced the neglect of local livelihoods. In the
countries of the global south seeking to foster national in-
dustrialization while also facing rapid urbanization, city
authorities took care of physical planning issues, while
national authorities focused on economic planning pri-
orities and large-scale policy initiatives like workforce
development, health, and education. The policy distinc-
tion between the physical and economic domains, or be-
tween reproduction and production, mapped onto the
bureaucratic structures of the state in ways that frag-
mented political authority and urban governance in and
over informal areas.
Local authorities may have struggled for the devel-
opment of housing, but without command over employ-
ment and macroeconomic policy, they were not in a po-
sition to guarantee residents’ income capacities to ac-
quire homes, nor were city finances adequate to pick up
the slack by offering full subsidies to the un- or under-
employed. Furthermore, local and national authorities
rarely coordinated their scale-specific developmental pri-
orities. This led to an array of federally funded projects
and arrangements (such as land regularization; sites and
services; and squatter upgrading, imposedwith grants to
federal states from the World Bank or the International
Monetary Fund) that usually served only a small part
of the urban population and that, when put into ac-
tion, tended to spatially fragment cities even further. For
example, such programs often divided informal settle-
ments intomultiple ‘housing classes’ (Gilbert, 1986). The
imposing of property rights, without any consideration
of the larger economic or social impacts of home own-
ership or its effects on solidarity within the community,
led to social fragmentation between thosewith andwith-
out title. Such conditions pushed those without title to
become more dependent on local power brokers, even
as those with title became further tied to formal gov-
ernance institutions. Both reinforced modes of patron-
age that sustained both informal and formal political au-
thority in the same urban spaces. Such occurrences fur-
ther weakened the horizontal relations of the commu-
nity even as they increased citizen reliance on whichever
leader could mediate service provision and heteroge-
neous community claims (Auyero, 2007; McIlwaine &
Moser, 2001). In turn, those who possessed the power
to mediate between the informal and informal systems
of service provision, as well as between illicit and licit ac-
tivities, gained both politically and economically
Yet precisely because such activities and exchanges
were by their very nature conducted outside the law,
they strengthened illegal markets for urban services and
further laid the foundation for the rise of illicit brokers,
further upping the stakes for those who had the politi-
cal power to protect them (Leeds, 1996). To the extent
that informal political leaders built local legitimacy on
their capacities to protect illegal or illicit markets among
the poor or informal areas, both residents and these in-
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formal leaders needed each other (Arias, 2004, 2006b;
Cross, 1998). These conditions further tied informal bro-
kers and residents to each other in alternative reciproc-
ities that distanced them from the formal city and from
the rule of law. In the midst of these developments, vio-
lence soon became the currency of power.
4. Informality, Globalization, and Violence: Reinforcing
Alternative Sovereignties
To the extent that informal brokers protected the liveli-
hoods of informal residents, their activities challenged
formal planning practices as well as the legitimate au-
thority of local officials to regulate, monitor, and con-
trol the urban territory. Across Latin America, this usually
meant that local police did not stand by quietly. As in-
formality accelerated, police were expected to aggres-
sively respond by displacing illegal occupiers and harass-
ing or expelling street vendors (Collier, 1976). Police be-
havior may well have traced its origins to the state’s de-
sire to impose certain forms of spatial order and social
values on marginalized groups. However, upon entering
these informal spaces police usually accommodated and
even perpetuated the informal order. Like informal lead-
ers themselves, police were known to work with, ne-
gotiate, or extort vulnerable residents—especially those
wanting to deviate from urban regulatory requirements
(Davis, 2006b). In communities of lesser income, the op-
portunity for extortionwas often so great that police and
informal leaders alike wound up competing for control
of local protection rackets, with citizens vulnerable to
both the formal and informal actors who monitored or
controlled everyday spaces (Hinton & Newburn, 2008;
Koonigs & Krujit, 2005; Uldriks, 2009). Over time, how-
ever, this situation cemented durable networks of com-
plicity between police and local leaders involved in illicit
enterprises, with such relationships becoming stronger
and more nefarious as informal economies expanded.
This was best exemplified in instances where extortion
markets dealt in traded goods thatmoved through urban,
national, and transnational supply chains.
In those environments where police protected crim-
inals at the expense of residents, and where the terri-
toriality of unsanctioned and illegal trade transcended
the local bounds of communities, violence was far more
likely (Davis, 2013). This happened not merely because
the participation of police in illegal enterprises under-
mined the rule of law, but also because police abuses of
power led to widespread mistrust of state authorities by
residents. In these conditions, informal political leaders
at the community level gained greater powers of control
over social and spatial dynamics. The further these infor-
mal systems of extortion and trade spread beyond com-
munity boundaries (a consequence of the inability of lo-
cal states to isolate and control informal urban activity),
the larger the sums of money exchanged and the more
subtly dispersed such exchange networks became. In the
face of territorially expanding illicit networks with higher
financial stakes, violence—actual and threatened—had
the tendency to become theprominent technique for the
assertion of authority (Davis, 2006a).
The combined effect of all these developments pro-
duced an alternative governance regime embedded in in-
formal urbanism, built on new modalities of loyalty and
allegiance emanating from neighborhoods, but slowly
expanding beyond. This is precisely where the concep-
tual lens of sovereignty begins to make sense: It refers
to the emergence of alternative loyalties based on in-
formal connections between marginalized residents and
local leaders who built their governing power and re-
ciprocities through illicit activities. That the emergence
of informal forms of governance and illicit enterprises
began locally, but over time began to operate at both
the sub- and transnational scales, further strengthened
the durability of these arrangements. Precisely because
these emergent communities of allegiance and mutual-
exchange enabled unique opportunities for meaningful
welfare, they began to function as veritable ‘mini-states’
capable of sustaining novel instantiations of non-state-
based forms of sovereignty, in stark contrast to the previ-
ous ‘imagined community’ of national state sovereignty
(Anderson, 2006). These local imagined communities of
allegiance must rely on ‘homegrown’ armed constituen-
cies to protect and maintain both their economic liveli-
hoods and their relatively autonomous dominion, par-
ticularly in cases of conflict with formal authorities and
nation-state policies (Davis, 2010). This means that in
many Latin American cities, state-administered mecha-
nisms of control (such as providing ‘security’ or infras-
tructure provision) have been taken over by unsanc-
tioned actors (such as mafias or private security forces
and militias) whose allegiance is solely to their client
communities and/or networked territories, rather than
formal state, as has traditionally been the case (Muller,
2010). In this unrestrained, wild-west atmosphere of al-
ternative sovereignty, violence is a central form of cur-
rency, serving to sustain economic and political power.
Yet it lies in the hands of illicit and informal actors orga-
nized at the local scale as much as in the hands of the
national state.
As violence is used by both state and non-state ac-
tors in the struggle to buttress their preferred forms of
sovereignty, urban residents are increasingly caught in
the crossfire. In an ideal world, both democracy and rule
of law would be activated to protect and engage the
citizenry in the face of growing violence, with such re-
sponses strengthening the legitimacy of state authority.
Yet owing to decades of neglect as well as social and spa-
tial exclusion, many residents have been unwilling to buy
into a formal system of governance that promises to pro-
vide an antidote to violence, but that allows police im-
punity to fuel that violence. In the face of these failures,
some of the most marginalized urban residents prefer to
forge new loyalties or cast their allegiance to non-state
‘authorities,’ including local mafia leaders (Arias, 2006b;
Colette & Cullen, 2000; Goldstein, 2003). Once this hap-
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pens, the sovereign power of the national state, and its
legitimate claims to territory, allegiance, and rule of law,
may be broken in fundamental ways. In such conditions,
both local and national efforts to use policy, planning,
and policing tools to serve the population are also dele-
gitimized, further laying the foundation for more exclu-
sion, neglect, and violence.
Despite the fact that these rather depressing out-
comes find their origins in mid-century modernist plan-
ning decisions, the intensification of globalization and
neo-liberalization over the past few decades has wors-
ened the problem. Neoliberalism has limited the bud-
getary powers of domestic authorities to accommodate
the urban poor, while globalization has strengthened the
economic networks that propel alternative sovereignties.
In the contemporary era, the opening of borders and
expansion of international trade privileges transnational
connections among licit and illicit activities alike. This too
has undermined efforts to control of violence, which in
turn eats into the national state’s capacity to monopo-
lize the means of coercion. Moreover, the acceptance of
global markets and the reduced legitimacy of the nation-
state in the face of economic liberalization, increasing
urban inequality, and violence have further eaten into
patterns of allegiances and reciprocity between citizens
and the nation-state. This is particularly so among those
urban residents who remain socially and spatially en-
meshed in informal economic regimes built on forms of
subsistence that are constructed through transnational
supply chains (Hasan, 2002). With neo-liberalization fur-
ther undermining traditional import-substitution indus-
trialization and the supply of factory jobs, even as it inten-
sifies the financialization of the economy, formal employ-
ment opportunities for the poor continue to disappear.
With these negative effects often felt most dramatically
in major cities across Latin America, urban residents are
now evenmore likely to turn local strongmen—including
criminal mafias empowered by trade of illicit goods—for
guardianship over and against nation-state efforts to po-
lice neighborhoods in an effort to restore formal socio-
spatial orders (Arias, 2006b).
The problem, however, is not merely that transna-
tional networks of illicit trade can bring more violence
into local neighborhoods—a primary site from which
these activities emanate. Nor is it merely that these
strong transnational networks of illicit trade reinforce
the power and territorial control of these alternative
‘sovereigns’ (Davis, 2006a). Equally significant is the fact
that economic neo-liberalization is usually accompanied
by state downsizing, in which the fiscal capacities of au-
thorities to push back against both poverty and violence
is markedly reduced. This is not to say that state author-
ities have given up on addressing urban violence. Yet, as
recent examples from Mexico and Brazil both show, the
response is often more intense militarization of coercive
force against illicit transnational smugglers. InMexico un-
der President Calderón, for example, military operations
against drug-traffickers generated opposition from citi-
zens who become collateral damage, while in contem-
porary Brazil President Bolsonaro’s adoption of extreme
militarization has produced cries of opposition from hu-
man rights activists who see innocent favela residents
caught up in armed police raids. Both responses reduce
the state’s legitimacy in ways that may allow alternative
sovereign loyalties to persist.
5. Challenging Urban Violence and Alternative
Sovereignties through Planning Action: Concluding
Remarks
So, is there any exit from this troubling state of affairs?
It goes without saying that planners across urban Latin
America are bound to be hamstrung in their efforts to
deal with the problems of ongoing urban violence, if only
because their implementation capacities and authority
frequently owe to the legitimacy of the local or national
state ‘sovereigns’ on whose behalf they are planning and
intervening. In that sense, planning theorists and urban
practitioners will have to be cognizant of their own lim-
itations, and will need to work with citizens and others
whose efforts to wrench control of local conditions away
from the perpetrators of violence must remain at the
frontlines of action. Having said this, a focus only on a
single community or bounded site where violence and
illicit activities flower will not readily undermine or chal-
lenge the historically-produced networks of power and
allegiance that keep illicit economies vibrant, territorially
networked, and expansive. Moreover, dealing with net-
worked urban violence in an environment where poverty
persists and employment alternatives are limited will be
difficult for the planning profession. This is particularly so
because in recent years the discipline has moved away
from comprehensive spatial planning even as it contin-
ues to undervalue the importance of job creation in plan-
ning praxis, instead focusingmost of its attention on com-
munity level interventions and processes of citizen partic-
ipation more than large-scale territorial reconfiguration.
Yet pessimism and hopelessness are not going to solve
the problemeither.We have no choice but to think about
productive pathways forward to reduce the risks and vul-
nerabilities associated with chronic urban violence, even
if elimination of its root sources remains elusive.
In general, planners would do well to turn their at-
tention toward recasting the spatial scales of interven-
tion, and examining as well as questioning the scalar bi-
ases of planning action in an effort to cultivate syner-
gies across the various competing territorial fragments
that make up today’s cities. The spatial fragmentation of
Latin American cities was set in motion by the uneven
application of infrastructure investments and resources
in the first place, and a rethinking of ways to reduce or
eliminate spatial inequities is a good place to start for fu-
ture planning action. To a certain degree, planners may
still be hamstrung by overarching ideological projects
(whether in the form of allegiances to modernism, ne-
oliberalism, or even the embrace of anarchism/critical
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planning mantras) that accept a diminished state role.
Yet in order to exit from the problems of violence gen-
erated by the shifting territorialities of sovereignty, plan-
nersmust identify alternative planning and policy actions
capable of networking spatially disjointed spaces and es-
tablishing shared social allegiances that link the city to
the nation. These will require significant resources and
possibly even concerted state action. Toward these ends,
I suggest planners think along the following lines:
First, recognize that violence is a planning problem.
For far too long, questions of urban violence have been
relegated to the worlds of social policy and to special-
ists focused on police professionalization, the courts, or
the justice system. Yet the spatial concentration and
correlates of urban violence, which may be as obvious
in cities like Newark as they are in Mexico City or São
Paulo, cry out for spatially-sensitive approaches to mit-
igating or reducing violence. All future spatial interven-
tions in a neighborhood or city should be reviewed for
the impacts on socio-spatial exclusion and how they
might inadvertently empower the perpetrators of vio-
lence. Certain investments or interventionsmay bemore
likely to strengthen as opposed toweaken illicit activities.
Planners should think about actions or programs that
undermine or transform the local economic activities
that strengthen organized criminal leadership. They also
should consider social, infrastructural, and economic in-
terventions that reduce citizen dependence on illicit net-
works and the activities that fuel their vibrancy.
Second, strengthen novel forms of citizen mobiliza-
tion or participation that empower residents to identify
the root causes violence while also providing opportu-
nities to construct alternative social and political spaces
for action. Residents must be given the resources to cul-
tivate relative autonomy from perpetrators of violence,
whether they are informal leaders or the coercive forces
of the state. Planners can support these efforts by help-
ing citizens identify the activities and behaviors that prop
up illicit networks, using this knowledge to construct se-
curity strategies that are appropriate to the room daily
settings. This, in essence, is a call for constructing secu-
rity practices from ‘below’ rather than from ‘above,’ so
that residents are no longer forced to depend on state
and/or market actors for protection. Instead, we must
recognize that citizens caught in networks of violence
have a better understanding of what is or is not possi-
ble then external experts looking for one-size-fits-all so-
lutions. In light of this, residents of violence-prone neigh-
borhoods must be empowered and resourced to make
their own decisions about what to secure, how, and why.
Failure to enhance the agency of residents with respect
to the institutions and practices that propagate violence
will slow down efforts to increase safety.
Third, radically transform urban planning episte-
mologies and practices to focus less on isolated com-
munities, and instead recognize the overlapping net-
works of (inter)activities and mutual allegiances that
work in, through, and beyond individual neighborhoods.
We must question standard planning practices built on
the assumption that local communities are both the
starting and ending point for action. We have seen that
although chronic urban violence may start in a given
community, it will network across the city as a whole,
emanating across a nation and transnationally. Planning
actions should be oriented towards transcending spa-
tial isolation of communities while also reconfiguring
the activities that embed them in networks of violence.
This does not mean forgetting about the importance
of fostering horizontal connections among community
residents. However, community solidarity should be de-
veloped with an eye to programs that help residents
break or disrupt the illicit activities that have pulled
their communities into larger territorial networks of vi-
olence. Planners must pay attention to infrastructural,
social, and economic programs and policies that foster
such ends. New or increased investments as well as eco-
nomic projects that redirect and inject wealth into infor-
mal and/or marginalized urban territories, but in ways
that strengthen integral immersion within and spatial
connection to the ‘formal’ city, are a first step towards
reversing the territorial isolation that contributes to vio-
lence and precarity among the urban poor.
Fourth, question and re-conceptualize the current
‘formal–informal’ binary, which persists in urban plan-
ning practices. This will require greater appreciation for
the array of ‘alternative urbanisms’ produced and prac-
ticed bymarginalized and excluded populations, and a re-
assessment of the everyday practices undertaken by res-
idents to create their own livelihoods in an environment
of scarcity. Promoting or valuing the ingenuity of infor-
mality can provide a platform for challenging the inferior
status ascribed to informal locations and activities, even
as it can serve as a basis for learning from residents’ own
efforts to strengthen and protect their neighborhoods
in the face of violence. One way to move forward ethi-
cally as well as constructively is to think about informal-
ity as a solution and not a problem. Planners should thus
engage with informality, and possibly even augment it
rather than try to banish it.
The bottom line is that the discipline of urban plan-
ning must re-conceptualize its long-standing assump-
tions as well as overarching spatial planning goals, with
the aim of prioritizing connections among formal and in-
formal activities and locations at the scale of the city.
Breaking down the formal–informal divide in planning
epistemology will help advance these aims, by ensuring
that certain areas of the city do not become so severely
stigmatized that authorities fail to integrate them into
the urban economy and the larger polity. To accomplish
such aims, informal settlements and other marginalized
neighborhoods should be recognized as holding value
while also being socially, spatially, and politically incor-
porated into all larger visions of city-building. This will
also help urban planning practitioners to prioritize dis-
cussions of how distinctive communities can be linked
to the city as a whole, and by so doing prioritize actions
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that effectively connect citizens in one location to those
in another, thus providing the basis for socio-spatial in-
clusion rather than exclusion or division. Such planning
and policy developments can form the foundation for
newnetworks of allegiance and new forms of political au-
thority at scales larger than the community but smaller
than the nation-state, thus allowing for pushback against
transnationally networked activities that allow violence
to flower.
In a globalizing world it may be easy for citizens to de-
tach themselves from the idea of the nation-state as the
primordial site for political allegiance and sovereignty,
and instead become tied to alternative, ‘imagined com-
munities’ grounded in local realities even if the latter are
transnationally connected. In Latin America violence has
flowered where these two scales of allegiance are in ten-
sion, leaving many residents with mixed loyalties. In sit-
uations of chronic violence, the desire for pacified or-
der often becomes so urgent that there is a danger of
succumbing to a nostalgia for the state-based modernist
techniques of mass social and spatial control that helped
fuel violence in the first place. Against such a regression,
we must vigilantly pursue alternative scales of sovereign
allegiance and new forms of imagined community forma-
tion, built around tangible planning actions that connect
diverse territorial parts and wholes with the aim of cre-
ating new social and spatial synergies in cities that oper-
ate beyond simplistic, state-based understandings of the
‘enfranchisement vs. disenfranchisement’ binary. At the
very least, such actions could cultivate a new sense of col-
lective purpose linking human communities of citizens,
committed and prepared to push back against the rav-
ages of life-denying violence increasingly widespread in
Latin American cities today.
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